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Abstract

The purpose of this research was to explore how United States Air Force Emergency Operation Centers
(EOC) compare to civilian EOCs with respect to their task-based social networks and decision making social
networks. Multiple measures were explored to understand the networks, which included analyzing key metrics of
the network such as closeness centrality and betweenness centrality, centralization of the network, and comparison
of structural holes within the networks. These measures were then used to suggest improvements for the
organizations to improve performance and more importantly, interoperability.
The results of the study showed that in this data set there were several differences between how military
and civilian networks are structured. These differences could lead to incongruencies that could cause chaos, delays,
duplication of effort, and inefficiency when multiple EOCs are responding to a crisis event. While the cause of the
differences is unclear the social network methodology provides new and informative insight into the form and
properties of the networks.
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AN EXPLORATORY SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN
EMERGENCY OPERATION CENTERS FOCUSING ON ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
I. Introduction

The goal of this study is to take a critical look at how the United States Air Force (USAF)
is implementing Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) with respect to command
and control entities above the Incident Commander (IC) level in comparison with our civilian
counterparts. The majority of USAF base level Fire Protection Flights have been integrating
with local fire departments and using the Incident Command System (ICS) for many years to
manage emergencies. One of the goals of HSPD-5, with respect to the USAF, is to extend that
synergy to the command and control levels above the IC level, which were previously called by
many names including the Survival Recovery Center, the Alternate Battle Staff, Primary Battle
Staff, Wing Operations Center, Commander’s Action Group, and others. HSPD-5 requires a
new level of interoperability between civilian and military command and control organizations
during responses to emergency situations. Part of this interoperability is a common operating
structure. This requirement drove a reorganization of the functions within the USAF that deal
with Emergency Management (EM), and in this study the focus is on the transformation of the
Survival Recovery Center into the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in order to match the
structural organization of our civilian counterparts.
This study uses a methodology called Social Network Analysis (SNA). The goal of the
SNA, in this study, is to compare the command and control networks derived from the flow of
information in a task and decision making network for the USAF during an emergency situation
to that of a civilian EOC during a similar emergency situation. At its simplest SNA graphically
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represents connections between entities and has the ability to measure characteristics of those
connections. It is increasingly applied to many disciplines including the investigation of
organizational structures, financial transactions, the spread of disease, and studies where the
connections between entities are important (Wasserman, S. and Faust, K. 1994). This
comparison will be accomplished by analyzing data about how personnel in the USAF and
civilian EOCs interact within their organization during an emergency event and representing it
graphically and analytically using SNA. The social networks will then be compared to see where
they match and where there are disparities. The likeness or dissimilarity of the networks will
highlight areas that could be capitalized upon to improve interoperability or areas that need to be
addressed through training, process changes, or awareness level to improve operations.

Background
The recent events of Hurricane Katrina, the September 11th terrorist attacks, and the most
recent Space Shuttle incident have shed light on the fact that in a highly technological world our
response agencies at higher command and control levels are not very well connected, or
interoperable. Under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) several initiatives have been
enacted to resolve this issue. This study will mainly focus on HSPD-5 and how it is being driven
by the National Response Framework (NRF) January 2008, which covers the interaction of
multiple agencies at the local, state and federal levels.
The NRF, National Incident Management System (NIMS), and Air Force Instruction 102501 are three specific documents that provide direction for emergency management. As
mentioned previously, HSPD-5 signed by President George W. Bush on February 28th 2003,
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directs the USAF, as part of a federal department or agency, to adopt the NRF. The purpose of
the NRF is to
“… ensure that all response partners across the Nation understand domestic
incident response roles, responsibilities, and relationships in order to respond
more effectively to any type of incident.”

The NRF should provide the strategic view for reorganizing the USAF Emergency Management
mission to meet the needs of the country. The first key principle of the NRF is an “Engaged
Partnership” which allows leaders at all levels to develop shared response goals and align
capabilities (NRF, 2008). By aligning capabilities we create a common language so that during a
crisis, multiple organizations can exchange information, make direct requests for assistance, and
know what each other will bring to the table. While the NRF focuses on the big picture of
organizations interacting, the NIMS reinforces the ICS first used by the US Forest Service in the
1970s to fight wild fires. The ICS provided a way for first responders from many different
regions to come together and perform a common mission. Use of the ICS spread to the fire
fighting community, in general, as well as the law enforcement and medical response
communities. The AF firefighting organization has used the ICS for many years and to a lesser
degree so has the Security Forces and medical response forces. They regularly interacted with
their civilian counterparts through memoranda of understanding and mutual aid agreements.
These interactions and adoption of the ICS have led to organizations that communicate easily
and know the organizational structures of their peers; facilitating aid during times of crisis.
Finally, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-2501(September 2007), AIR FORCE EMERGENCY

3

MANAGEMENT (EM) PROGRAM PLANNING AND OPERATIONS, proposes to implement
the NRF and NIMS in the AF EM program.

Problem Statement
Since all emergency response organizations should strive for seamless interoperability,
the issue becomes how do the many disparate organizations involved in an emergency response
interpret the guidance and implement it in their own organization. The goal is not to force all
agencies to use the same structure and procedures but to have a common underlying framework
or language to increase interoperability. In order to improve the implementation of the
framework, again the NRF, NIMS, and AFI 10-2501 in the case of the Air Force, it must be
understood how organizations are implementing the framework in their organizations. With this
understanding, the organizations can then work to enhance or improve interoperability, and other
performance measures, by modifying their own processes or developing a greater understanding
of how their partner organizations operate during a crisis. This understanding should be
developed long before the crisis occurs through joint training and communication to help
understand EOC differences.

Research Objectives
The research conducted in this study is from an exploratory or inductive perspective. It is
assumed that the data gathered will accurately reflect the ground truth in EOCs within the AF
and civilian community. Based on this data and a review of the current literature, conclusions
will be drawn on the interoperability between AF and civilian EOCs. Since all organizations
involved in this study fall under the guidance of the NRF and NIMS, and the structure of their
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respective EOCs should meet the intent, if not the word of the guiding documents, it is
reasonable to assume that even though the organizations operate in different environments it is
possible to compare their operations and structure based on the framework of the NRF and
NIMS.

Methodology Overview
As stated previously a SNA is the primary tool being used to accomplish the research
objectives of this study. The process will consist of four steps. First, surveys will be developed
to gather the necessary information. Next, the surveys will be validated against a sample
population. Third, the surveys will be refined and distributed to the target audience. Finally, the
data will be entered into a SNA program called UCINET© and analyzed.
The survey development will be broken into two subsections. The first will focus on
simple background data to provide insight into how experience might affect the networks. The
second section will gather data on how information flows in each EOC for both a task network
and a decision making network. Additionally, data will be gathered on the frequency each
function in the EOC uses specific information management tools to share information with other
EOC functions.
After development, the surveys will be validated using a limited distribution to the focus
audience. Feedback will be collected through face to face interviews with local emergency
management entities. The surveys will then be refined using the data acquired and distributed to
the main focus group. This group will consist of two sub groups one for the USAF and one for
our civilian counterparts.
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Finally, the data collected from the surveys will be inputted into a SNA program and
analyzed. The analysis will create a graphic representation of the networks involved from which
conclusions can be drawn with respect to the research objectives proposed earlier. Also, a
numerical analysis will be conducted to discover nodes with centrality, density, clusters, and
other relevant characteristics.

Assumptions
This study is based on five main assumptions that set the foundation from which all
conclusions will be drawn. These assumptions focus the research and provide a common starting
point from which logic can progress.
The first assumption is that the USAF’s primary mission will be engage in and win
military conflicts concurrent with the National Security Strategy (Air Force Doctrine Center
2003). These conflicts whether conventional wars, insurgent warfare or military operations other
than war will always take precedence over other secondary missions. These conflicts will
mainly occur on foreign soil. The basis of education, research and development, acquisition, and
strategy will and should focus on the primary mission.
The second assumption is that the USAF may be requested to assist civilian authorities
during catastrophic crises on American soil (Air Force Doctrine Center 2003). Due to the nature
of our primary mission the capabilities of the USAF including mobility, command and control,
information management, and vast equipment and personnel resources are some of the only
assets that can be quickly and efficiently brought to bear during times of national crisis. These
abilities will be sought after by local and federal response agencies alike.
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Based on the first two assumptions a third assumption is that the USAF EM mission, as
applied to civilian support, will always be a secondary duty for the USAF, but one that will be
highly scrutinized, criticized, and thus maintain a high level of importance in the mission set of
the USAF. This scrutiny and criticism is a good thing and must be used to improve our
procedures. In both our primary and secondary missions the cost of failure is too high to rest on
our past and current successes. This provides the basis for the research conducted in this study.
In order to perform the secondary mission we must be able to communication and share
information effectively with our civilian counterparts.
There are two other assumptions in this research. One of these assumptions that bear
being brought to light is that a peacetime Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or
Explosive (CBRNE) event on American soil will tax our EM organization structure and
information management tools in a similar manner as any catastrophic event with the same three
assumptions above. This limitation allows a baseline scenario to be used so that a comparison
can be accomplished. A CBRNE event has a large enough scope that it will fully task most of
the important functions in the EOC in both a civilian and military environment. It is also a likely
scenario that will require the cooperation of military and civilian organizations. Another
assumption is that the authors of the NRF and NIMS documents are correct in their presumption
that the EOC structure is one that will perform well in a crisis event and foster interoperability
between responding organizations.
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II. Literature Review

Interoperability, NRF/NIMS, AFIMS
As stated in the introduction the purpose of this study is to compare AF and civilian
EOCs. It is hoped that this comparison will show the level of interoperability of the two
structures. In order to accomplish the comparison we should first explore the concept of
interoperability. According to Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, interoperability can be defined as
the,
“ability of a system (as a weapons system) to work with or use the parts or

equipment of another system” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 2008).
Another definition of interoperability by the IEEE is,
“the ability of two or more systems or components to exchange information and
to use the information that has been exchanged” (Institute of Electrical and
Electronic Engineers 1990).
Both of these definitions are very focused on the technical aspect of interoperability and can be
applied to non-technical systems but must be clarified. A final definition of interoperability can
be found in Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 and says,
“(*) 1. The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. 2.
(DOD only) The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems
or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services
can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The
degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases.(JP
3-32)”
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where the * identifies a definition accepted by both DoD and NATO. The jointly accepted
definition applies interoperability to a much broader base with applications to both technical
systems and the human organization. Both the technical and general application of
interoperability is of interest in this study.
Under the taskings of HSPD-5 the NIMS was born to provide the interoperability needed
to provide today’s EM professionals with the capabilities to respond not only to resolve the day
to day local incidents, but also the growing number of catastrophic level incidents that quickly
overwhelm the resources and abilities of local responders. As seen in section 15 of HSPD-5, the
NIMS is to provide interoperability through a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and
technologies.
(15) The Secretary shall develop, submit for review to the Homeland Security
Council, and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS). This
system will provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local
governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond
to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity.
To provide for interoperability and compatibility among Federal, State, and local
capabilities, the NIMS will include a core set of concepts, principles, terminology,
and technologies covering the incident command system; multi-agency
coordination systems; unified command; training; identification and management
of resources (including systems for classifying types of resources); qualifications
and certification; and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident
information and incident resources. (Section 15 of HSPD-5)

9

Based on this statement it is clear that the intent of HSPD-5 is to create not only interoperable
technology systems, but also organization structures and procedures that increase
interoperability. Also from HSPD-5 we see that the NRF (previous versions of the NRF were
called the National Response Plan or NRP) is to use NIMS to create the structure and
mechanisms for response.
(16) (a) The NRP, using the NIMS, shall, with regard to response to domestic
incidents, provide the structure and mechanisms for national level policy and
operational direction for Federal support to State and local incident managers and
for exercising direct Federal authorities and responsibilities, as appropriate.
(Section 16 of HSPD-5)
These structures and mechanisms must create an interoperable system in order to meet the intent
of NIMS.
Based on the above it is reasonable to state that interoperability is a key component of the
nation’s strategy to improve EM, and that interoperability is present in both the technical systems
such as databases, equipment tracking systems, certification processes and in the organizational
structures through the use of the ICS and EOC constructs. These same components should be
seen in both AF and civilian EOCs and the tools used to manage both the organization and its
assets to include information. For this to be the case, the policies and documents which govern
those organizations and assets should provide similar guidelines. While NIMS is the construct
which implements our nation’s EM strategy, the NRF is the document which describes how
federal, state, local, and tribal agencies in addition to private organizations and NGOs will work
together to gain interoperability, especially above the incident command level. On the AF side,
AFI 10-2501 or AFIMS implements the NIMS.
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The NRF has five key principles, three of which apply directly to interoperability. First
the principle of Engaged Partnership expresses the idea of integrated goals, communication, and
activity (NRF 2008). Through regular planning both within and outside of jurisdictional lines
the organizations involved can develop shared goals and aligned capabilities. By doing this,
organizations can develop an understanding of what each other’s intentions are during a crisis
which will allow them to compliment each other’s activities. This is similar to commander’s
intent. When all the units understand the intent of the commander, they are capable of assessing
the situation at hand and adapting their strategies to best accomplish the intents of the
commander. The next aspect is communication. As the crisis develops, communication about
the incident from both on-scene sources and reach-back capabilities needs to flow smoothly and
in a manner that is easily understood. Through the engaged partnership, the interoperability of
communication processes will provide the ability for all organizations to develop a similar
mental picture, or situational awareness, of the crisis and how they can apply their capabilities to
help accomplish the shared goals. This interoperable communication process reaches back to
both the technical definition of interoperability where the technological systems can
communicate with each in a manner that is understandable and usable, and to the fuzzier
organizational concept of interoperability where the information communicated finds its way to
the correct people and is understood in a similar manner. Finally, through an engaged
partnership the NRF makes it possible to take the appropriate actions based on shared goals, an
understanding of each other capabilities and a shared situational awareness. These actions are
synergistic in their effects and should produce fewer conflicts.
The second key principle of the NRF is the idea of scalable, flexible, and adaptable
operational capabilities. The NRF has a disciplined and coordinated process which allows
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organizations to quickly increase their response when a crisis expands in size and scope. This is
only possible because the NRF is built on common organizational structures and capabilities.
According to the NRF, “Adoption of the Framework across all levels of government and with
businesses and NGOs will facilitate interoperability and improve operational coordination” (NRF
2008).
The third key principle of the NRF is the idea of unity of command. The ideal
interoperable structure would be identical between two organizations. This is both an unrealistic
and unnecessary goal, but a unified command that respects the authority and mechanisms by
which each organization accomplishes its mission is necessary. Through this unified command
the goal is to “… harness seamless coordination across jurisdictions in support of common
objectives.” (NRF 2008). It is necessary to note that while the DoD is a dedicated participant in
the national response strategy the idea of unified command in the NRF is different and does not
usurp the military command structure (AFI 10-2501 2007). Also noteworthy, despite the fact
that most of the discussion above focused on the response aspect of EM, the principles are
applicable to all aspects of EM from preparedness to response to recovery.
In order for interoperability to work, all participants must agree to follow the same or
similar procedures. The NRF even states that federal, state, local, private organizations, and
NGOs need to adapt and apply the guidelines of the framework in order to be successful. AFI
10-2501, or AFIMs, is the codification of the AF’s effort to implement HSPD-5 and the NRF and
NIMS. Almost immediately, AFIMs references NIMs strategy for interoperability through a
core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies. These include the ICS, unified
command (as defined by NIMS and not DoD), certification, resource classification, and incident
information collection, tracking, and reporting. Unified command and the processes surrounding
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information collection are very similar between the NRF and AFIMs. AFIMs also focuses on the
Common Operating Picture (COP) and puts forth the philosophy that there are two main
components to the COP, the ICS and information management. As stated in the NRF, both of
these are aspects of a shared situational awareness that allow diverse organizations to come
together with synergistic effects.
Another strong focus of AFIMs interoperability is on technical interoperability.
Interoperability is mentioned five times in just one section consisting of 12 lines of text. The
section is dedicated to the Air Force Communication Agency and how our technical command
and control systems have to work together to share information. Finally, AFIMs provides a
common terminology translator. This section allows AF personnel who are comfortable with
legacy terms for EM and its associated command and control procedures to adopt the new
common language that will unite federal agencies and allow greater interoperability.
The NRF and AFIMs are two key documents for this analysis. They provide the policy
and guidance by which the civilian and AF EOCs are run. Both documents clearly focus on
creating greater interoperability between agencies. This is created through shared goals,
structure and communication methods. The following review explores a method using SNA to
compare the structure of the two organizations and how the communication flows within the
EOCs.

Brief Social Network History
The methodology for this research is conducted using Social Network Analysis. SNA was
originally developed as part of the social sciences and had three main foundations; sociometric
analysts, researchers from Harvard during the 1930s, and anthropologists studying in turnover of
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personnel in our organizations. You can be sure that when an individual leaves the organization
the person who replaces them will not have the same behaviors or attitudes, however, the
relations developed by the outgoing individual can be passed on to the incoming individual
through continuity. For example, if you want to get a vehicle from transportation then you
simply fill out the appropriate request and give it to the appropriate office. This relation between
requestor and supply can be measured, documented and passed on. Albeit, the strength of this
connection is definitely affected by personal attitudes on both sides of the relationship but the
relation itself is key. Another important point to be made in both the military and civilian arena
is the popular cliché “it isn’t what you know but who you know”, leading us to believe that the
relations between one person and another through which information is passed is very influential
in accomplishing any mission. It is important to understand the history of SNA and in chapter 2
of John Scott’s Social Network Analysis, a Handbook we find an interesting look at SNA’s
foundations. Some of the earliest beginnings of SNA can be attributed to Jacob Moreno who,
rooted in psychotherapeutic methods, felt there was a specific logic behind the choices we make
in friendships and from these choices comes a social configuration which can be represented by a
sociogram (Scott 2000). As seen in Figure 1 below, the sociogram is a graphical representation
of the social configuration and uses nodes to represent individuals, say co-workers, and

Figure 1, Sociogram

directional lines or edges to represent the relations between those co-workers. Now that the
social configuration is represented graphically it can be analyzed mathematically using several
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tools, but here we specifically focus on graph theory (Cartwright 1956). In this usage, graph
theory is not what most people would assume, it is not the normal “x” and “y” axis forming a
graph, it is instead a collection of axioms and formulas used to analyze the points and lines
shown in Figure 1 above (Scott 2000). Therefore the social configuration can not only be
interpreted visually but also analytically.
The next major step in the evolution of SNA came from several researchers associated
with Harvard University during the 1930s. Their studies centered around finding sub-groups in
large systems based on informal relations similar to the social configurations mentioned above
and the major obstacle they faced was creating methods to find these sub-groups in different
systems in an efficient and repeatable manner (Scott 2000). One of the first attempts at this was
a basic trial and error reshuffling of relational information in a matrix form. The information
was reshuffled again and again until a pattern could be discerned and sub-groups could be
identified for further analysis (Homans 1951). The issue with this method arose in both its
efficiency and repeatability. As one can image if the data set contains more than just a few rows
and columns the iterative task of reshuffling the data until a pattern appears can be daunting.
Also, the pattern recognition will depend on the researcher and can vary from researcher to
researcher (Scott 2000). While pattern recognition was an exciting step forward in the use of
SNA more work would have to occur in order to make the methodology sound.
The next evolutionary step of SNA occurred at the Department of the Social
Anthropology at Manchester University. The Manchester Anthropologists, as they are
commonly referred to, attempted to take the metaphors of the “social web” and “social network”
and create a structural method behind the idea (Scott 2000).
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The final step was to apply mathematics to the network. This occurred at Harvard
University where researchers developed two mathematical principles to study SNA. The first
resulted in a return to the ideas of graph theory and other algebraic models to define and analyze
the idea of role or position in the social network (Scott 2000). Also, a scaling method was
developed to analyze the distance between nodes in the network, or the social distance (Scott
2000). These ideas were used by a researcher at Harvard named Harrison White. His group
expanded upon the types of research that SNA was used to explore by implementing the
mathematical analysis of the networks in addition to the relational analysis conducted by the
Manchester group. In the end it was this idea of using mathematical ideas to model the
characteristics of structural relations throughout the network that increased SNA’s popularity
(Scott 2000).

Social Networks and Emergency Management
The main impetus for this study came from several articles by Dekker (2002), Houghton,
et al (2006), and McMaster, et al (2005) discussing how SNA can be applied to command and
control situations in both the military and EM fields. The conclusions from these articles ranged
from four archetypes for command and control by Dekker (2002) to manipulating discovered
social networks to identify new and hopefully better ways to execute command control by
McMaster, et al (2005), being tied together by Houghton, et al (2006).
Dekker (2002) begins by identifying that traditionally, military command and control
structures have been very hierarchical in nature. The hierarchical structure could be the result of
many factors. Poor communication across very long distances created large time delays between
when an event was identified by intelligence assets, till they were able to report to command, and
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when command could then direct appropriate action for strike assets. Also, more recently, the
lethality and magnitude of consequences that a military action could cause and the need for
someone to be held responsible dictated a defined and rigid chain of command. In today’s world
communication methods and computer technology make it much easier to transfer information
between organizational elements (intelligence, command, and strike) driving the evolution of
new command and control hierarchies (Dekker 2002).
Dekker (2002) along with several other authors referenced here believe that SNA is an
excellent avenue for analyzing and comparing information flows. According to Allard (1996)
there are four main products of a SNA. 1) Develop a pictorial representation of the relationships
between people or organizational elements. 2) Develop an understanding of the factors which
affect those relationships and the correlation of the relationships. 3) Ascertain the effects of
those relationships such as deviation from standard operating procedures or the existence of an
informal leader. 4) Improve these relationships in order to more efficiently accomplish the
mission (Allard 1996). The comparison of these flows and which organizational elements are
involved is one of the key goals of this study.
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As a result of his work, Dekker (2002) proposed four main archetypes for command and
control based on a SNA. These archetypes can be seen in Table 1. Each of the four archetypes

Table 1, Archetypes, adapted from Dekker, 2002

is associated with a real world situation to better illustrate the structure. Centralized C2
structures are similar to how the USAF operated during Desert Storm using Airborne Warning
and Control Systems aircraft to gather intelligence from multiple radars, decide which threats are
the most important, and then vector in strike aircraft. The USAF’s excellent communication and
intelligence gathering capabilities in addition to the speed of strike aircraft allow it to use a
centralized structure and control the tempo of the engagement (Dekker 2002). The split C2
structure is more indicative of land based forces due to the addition of geographically localized
intermediate strike headquarters. This is due to the constantly changing terrain and local
condition that require quick changes in tactics made by an individual who is familiar with the
local conditions. The additional delay of an intermediate headquarters could result in a slower
response during a high tempo operation (Dekker 2002). Next, the distributed C2 structure is
often used by special operation forces and terrorist cells. It creates the shortest path between
18

intelligence and force asset which creates the shortest delay in action. However, since the C2
elements do not share information one element could be overloaded by intelligence while others
sit idle. In the distributed archetype the isolation of intelligence, command and strike assets due
to lack of information sharing results in no way to coordinate assets across the battlefield
(Dekker 2002). Finally, Dekker feels that the negotiated structure can represent emergency
responders who work in their own specific geographic areas and only interact with other
emergency responders when the crisis event exceeds their capabilities or stretches beyond their
geographic areas. The work of Houghton, et al (2006), which will be discussed later, does not
support this conclusion. Additionally, Dekker adds to the four archetypes by introducing a
concept called information sharing. The main structures do not change for the centralized and
split C2 structures, however, the information sent from the intelligence headquarters to the strike
headquarters does. Originally, the intelligence headquarters sent four flows of intelligence in
parallel to the strike headquarters, each flow corresponding to the respective strike units’
geographically matched intelligence unit. With information sharing, a delay in transmission of
information is incurred by the intelligence headquarters as it fuses the information from all
intelligence assets together and sends the combined package to the strike headquarters. In the
split and negotiated C2 structures, additional paths for information flow are needed since the
intelligence assets can now directly share their information with geographically adjoining strike
headquarters (Dekker 2002). Dekker (2002) believes that this is the genesis of Network Centric
Warfare as seen from a SNA perspective.
Dekker (2002) proposed to test his archetypes by creating a methodology called Force,
Intelligence, Networking and C2 (FINC). In FINC, an organization is modeled as an information
processing network which receives information from its environment, via intelligence assets.
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Next, the organization makes decisions through its command and control assets based partly on
the information received from intelligence. The organization then exerts some effect on the
environment through use of force assets as directed by command and control (Dekker 2002).
While Dekker (2002) uses FINC to model a traditional military organization, he clearly states
that it can be used on a multitude of organizations by being liberal with the definitions of force
and intelligence assets. In a commercial enterprise, a force asset could be a salesman and
intelligence assets could be market research.
FINC strives to improve the organization by identifying the information flows and quality
of those paths through the organization and identifying bottlenecks (Dekker 2002).
Identification is accomplished by assigning values to characteristics of the network including
intelligence quality, communication delays, and geographic area covered, including overlaps.
The values are derived from methods outside the scope of SNA. Once the values are available
through other data collection sources, Dekker (2002) uses them to create four measures of the
network’s health which are identified as information flow coefficients, coordination coefficients,
intelligence coefficients and intelligence volumes. The actual derivation of these values is not
necessarily pertinent to this discussion since they are simplifications of a very complicated
system. The key point is that once the network is discovered, quantifiable values can be assigned
and the network can be analyzed and adapted to find better functioning networks to accomplish
the mission.
Dekker (2002) uses three measures to categorize his archetypes and propose which
archetype is better suited based on conditions in a given environment. The first measure is
information superiority which is based on the quality of intelligence gathered by intelligence
assets, the delay incurred through the paths of communication and intermediate C2 nodes from
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the intelligence asset to the strike asset, and the number of intelligence assets available. Second
is coordination superiority, which is derived through the coordination coefficient which measures
the delay along the communication paths from one strike asset to another. Finally, a measure of
tempo superiority which is measured through the information flow coefficient which represents
the average of the time delays occurred along the communication paths from intelligence asset to
strike asset (Dekker 2002). By varying the probability from low to high that the information
transmitted by an intelligence asset is still useful when it gets to the strike asset and the quality of
the information itself many times over for each C2 archetype, Dekker (2002) was able identify
which archetypes performed the best in each situation, see
Table 2. Dekker (2002) admits some of the values used are over simplified but they represent a
method to analyze the different archetypes created from the SNA and that is the focus.

Poor
Distributed
Slow
w/ Info
Sharing
Tempo Moderate Distributed
w/ Info
Sharing
Distributed
Fast

Sensors
Fair
Centralized
w/ Info
Sharing
Negotiation
w/ Info
Sharing
Distributed

Good
Centralized
w/ Info
Sharing
Negotiation

Distributed

Table 2, Archetype versus Environment, adapted from Dekker, 2002

Another study that explored SNA and EM more closely was conducted by R. J.
Houghton, et al (2006). Their work focused on the police and fire services of a large district in
the United Kingdom. Houghton, et al (2006) were investigating other ways to evaluate a social
network focusing more on sociometric status and centrality of the nodes while still including the
effect of Dekker’s (2002) four archetypes.
Houghton, et al (2006) believed that if a command and control system was designed one
way, yet the actual network behaved in a different way, that tension could develop causing poor
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team performance. The change of structure could be the result of emerging technology which
increases the ease of sharing information and the speed and range it can be delivered. A good
example of this is the Net Centric Warfare doctrine in development by the United States military.
Also, the increasingly large geographical areas covered not only by military conflicts, but natural
disasters and global economies, are causing changes in the traditional command and control
hierarchies (Houghton, et al 2006).
A result of the changing C2 structure and the ease of sharing information is a denser
network. One benefit of denser networks is the ability of the organization to create teams as the
situation dictates, since most individuals are already connected by the dense network (Houghton,
et al 2006). This could allow information to flow more quickly from one part of the organization
to another through the dense network (Houghton, et al 2006). Unfortunately, a dense network
could have both negative as well as positive effects. The network could result in many
intermediate C2 elements which will cause inherent delays in processing information as each
node needs to absorb the data within the information then retransmit it to the appropriate units.
In the opposite perspective, as each C2 node receives information it can then fuse all of the
information together and possibly create more accurate intelligence (Houghton, et al 2006).
Based on this and other works it appears that network structure as compared to the task being
performed can affect team performance (Houghton, et al 2006).
Specifically, Houghton, et al (2006) created a SNA of three fire incidents and three police
incidents based on the communication between the actors of the incident. Houghton et al’s
(2006) analysis involved what the NRF/NIMS would call the Incident Command Structure. The
communication in question was between the incident commander and the different actors below
the incident commander and the organizations’ version of a central dispatch or radio operator
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who kept a log of the events. From these networks they focused on the sociometric status and
centrality of each node and the appearance of archetypes in the analyzed networks. To compare
the relative importance of nodes in the network, Houghton, et al (2006) computed a sociometric
index and a centrality index (Bavelas–Leavitt index) then defined “key” players by creating a
cutoff point based on the mean score plus one standard deviation (Houghton, et al 2006).
Through this method they determined key players for each of the six networks analyzed who had
a score higher than the mean plus one standard deviation. They also attempted to categorize
each incident by one of Dekker’s four archetypes or more traditional archetypes put forth by
Bavelas (1948) and Leavitt (1951) (Houghton, et al 2006).
In their conclusions, Houghton, et al (2006) believed that their work does not support
Dekker’s assertion that EM organizations will follow a negotiated network archetype. Two of
the fire services networks closely resembled distributed networks while the third resembled a
centralized network. All of the police networks were similar to split networks. The reason for
this is a need to centrally manage events (Houghton, et al 2006). For the police network, this
need could develop from the requirement to have an accurate police log of events that can be
submitted to a court of law. For fire incidents, the need could arise from the diverse information
flows that need to be managed (Houghton, et al 2006). No matter the reason why, Houghton, et
al’s (2006) work shows another method to describe a C2 hierarchy using a SNA and then analyze
that network using archetypes, sociometric status, and centrality values.
While Houghton, et al (2006) looked at six different incidents, McMaster, et al (2005)
focused on one police incident in order to discuss how the current C2 hierarchy might be affected
by Net Centric Warfare doctrine that is gathering momentum at the highest levels of both US and
UK defense enterprises (McMaster, Baber and Houghton 2005). The specific police incident
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involves the West Midlands Police (WMP) in the UK. WMP C2 hierarchy is similar to a US
police force for a large metropolitan area. A centralized 999 call center, comparable to a US 911
call center, handles all requests for assistance originating from the WMP area of operations. The
WMP also use an automated event log system called OASIS which tracks all calls and allows
999 and other C2 operators to input and read events. OASIS must be very accurate since it can
be submitted to a court of law. Co-located with the 999 operators is a Traffic operations C2
function. The Traffic Ops C2 controls specialized units divided between 21 geographic
subdivisions of the WMP area of operations. Each geographic subdivision is controlled by an
Operational Control Unit (OCU) who actually owns local police forces and some of the
specialized units coordinated by the traffic ops C2, see Figure 2.

Figure 2, WMP C2 Hierarchy, with permission (McMaster, Baber and Houghton 2005)
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McMaster, et al (2005) uses the same SNA that Houghton, et al (2006) used to evaluate this
organization. Unfortunately, there are disparities between the values obtained by McMaster, et
al (2005) and Houghton, et al (2006) for the sociometric status and centrality scores. This could
be due to a normalizing of the values by McMaster, et al (2005) or the use of different SNA
definitions to obtain the values. Since the exact values of the scores are not important at this
point, it is still relevant to the purpose of this study to explore the research. Houghton, et al
(2006) used their values directly to evaluate the SNA of EM organizations while McMaster, et al
(2005) suggests altering the SNA structures themselves to explore better C2 processes.
McMaster, et al (2005) analyzes Houghton et al’s (2006) model of a police incident
which resembles Dekker’s split archetype, Figure 3. In this model McMaster, et al (2005)

Figure 3, Police Incident Network, with permission (McMaster, Baber and Houghton 2005)
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measured the sociometric status of OCU ops, the Night Porter, Oasis, and Traffic Ops to meet
the requirement of key players, which is defined in the same manner as Houghton, et al (2006),
by the mean plus one standard deviation. Centrality key players are discovered to be OASIS and
OCU ops (McMaster, Baber and Houghton 2005). Some of the drawbacks of the split archetype,
specifically in this instance, are the additional C2 nodes in the network which could delay the
flow of information from the intelligence gathering 999 operators to the force implementers,
Units A – C and other local units. Also, the retransmission of information could lead to
inaccuracies and bias. The 999 operators verbally receive information from the Night Porter and
then enter the information into OASIS. The OCU and Traffic Ops operators then have to read
the information in OASIS, comprehend and interpret it, and verbally transmit the information to
the appropriate units (McMaster, Baber and Houghton 2005).
Now that the existing SNA is depicted and analyzed for possible negative effects, it is
possible to suggest alternate archetypes that would improve these negatives (McMaster, Baber
and Houghton 2005). One possible option is to transform the network into a centralized
archetype, Figure 4. This could be done by consolidating the local OCU operators with the
Traffic operators in a centralized control room.

Figure 4, Police Incident Network Adapted to Centralized Archetype, with permission (McMaster, Baber and
Houghton 2005)
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McMaster, et al (2005) feels this is justifiable since the C2 roles involve most the same
responsibilities and the sociometric and centrality scores of the entities are similar in the original
network. A new analysis of the social network shows that OCU and Local Unit A now have the
highest sociometric scores and OCU has the highest centrality. Two advantages from the new
network are a centralized force C2, OCU, which should lead to a more efficient response since a
singular C2 element could be very directive and ensure all pertinent response operations are
covered (McMaster, Baber and Houghton 2005). This could also eliminate any duplication of
efforts such as several units trying to locate and pursue an escaping criminal while no one
interviews the victim (McMaster, Baber and Houghton 2005). On the negative side, the distance
through the network has not been shortened so there are no obvious benefits gained in the way of
a faster response time or less opportunities for information to be biased or corrupted (McMaster,
Baber and Houghton 2005). Also, since there is one C2 element for all the responding forces,
one micromanaging personality in the C2 center could hamstring the responding units’ ability to
react to dynamic situations (McMaster, Baber and Houghton 2005).
Another option to improve the network would be to convert it to represent a Distributed
archetype, Figure 5.

Figure 5, Police Incident Network Adapted to Distributed Archetype, with permission (McMaster, Baber and
Houghton 2005)
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This would be accomplished by again combining OCU and Traffic Ops and additionally by
spreading out the existing communications to all parties involved in the incident (McMaster,
Baber and Houghton 2005). McMaster, et al (2005) believes this is justifiable since there is an
equal probability that all the units could communicate with each other if necessary. An analysis
of the new structure reveals more of a distinction between the levels of command than the Split
or Centralized archetypes. The local units can execute tactical command since they all have
direct access to the information in OASIS via personal communication devices or other
technology. This allows OCU to function as a strategic command cell (McMaster, Baber and
Houghton 2005). The sociometric status of OASIS and Unit A meet the requirements to be key
players in the network. While Unit A is the only player who qualifies to be central, but OASIS,
OCU, Units B, C and All Other Units fall just short of the cutoff value. This is to be expected
with a distributed network since lines of communication are open to all police units through
OASIS. A distributed network leads to several advantages including the rapid acquisition and
dissemination of information since most nodes are separated by only two steps, a reduction in
distance from intelligence gathering source to force application assets due to direct access to
OASIS which should also reduce the number of errors developed as information travels through
the system. Finally, the distributed network allows the responding officers to be self organizing
giving them the ability to adapt quickly to a dynamic situation (McMaster, Baber and Houghton
2005).
Based on the analysis above, the distributed network would seem to work best in the
given situation and similar situations (McMaster, Baber and Houghton 2005). This goes back to
Dekker’s ideas that the distributed network works well in situations with more uncertainty and
less reliable information (Dekker 2002). This would be a common scenario for emergency
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responders especially in the early stages of a crisis when events are changing rapidly, high
tempo, and the quality of information is very low. The distributed network could become more
of a reality for the WMP as they implement new technology that will further reduce the barriers
that drive a more traditional split network C2 hierarchy (McMaster, Baber and Houghton 2005).
The new technology is in the form of a new radio system that allows the responding officers to
communicate more directly with each other without a central dispatch and implements text and
picture messaging. It also allows officers to create emergent groups for communication during a
specific incident so that one transmission can be heard by all officers in the group without
detracting from the operations of other groups on the network (McMaster, Baber and Houghton
2005).

Social Network Performance Measures
A more generalized review of SNA literature reveals several other methods to apply
social network characteristics to networks in order to identify possible structures which could
result in increased individual, team or organization performance (Brass D. 2004). This section
reviews two of those methods with the intent of applying them to the collected data in order to
propose a well performing organization network. First, the disparity between a hierarchical
network structure supporting poor group performance (Cummings J. and Cross R. 2003) and a
decentralized network structure supporting improved group performance (Shaw 1964) for
complicated, knowledge intensive problems will be used to propose a well performing network.
Second, an integration of Boundary spanners as revealed through betweenness centrality scores
and the density of the groups involved will be used to define a well performing group (Burt
2001), (Cross R. and Cummings J. 2004), (Coleman 1990).
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Network Centralization
The first metric which used to identify how a group might perform based on its network
structure is the level to which it is decentralized (Shaw 1964) or conversely the more
hierarchical, or centralized, a network, the poorer its performance (Cummings J. and Cross R.
2003). Again this analysis is based on complex tasks versus simple tasks. Work conducted by
Cummings and Cross (2003) proposes that structural properties that restrict cross communication
by forcing vertical communication through a hierarchical structure will reduce performance of a
group. They base their hypothesis on two streams of thought. First, studies in task
interdependence tend to show greater production with more lateral communication. Second,
cognitive theories tend to show that more interaction will provided more access to group
expertise. Also, the study controls for differences in the communication levels of groups in order
to isolate the benefits derived from structure versus volume of communication (Cummings J. and
Cross R. 2003). The study used a Fortune 500 telecommunications firm as the test bed for the
analysis. The data was collected using a survey and the population for that survey was derived
from the firm’s process of rewarding the performance of groups within the company (Cummings
J. and Cross R. 2003). Managers nominated well performing groups who then presented their
projects to judges who rated the groups. The top performing groups based on the judges rating
then moved on to the next higher level of review. The rating of groups continued up through the
organization narrowing the pool of high performing groups. The survey was administered to a
total of 182 groups from three levels of judging. The degree of the group’s hierarchical nature
was determined by dichotomizing the communication network of the group to greater than
weekly communication and less than weekly communication using UCINET V© and then the
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network was run through the hierarchy routine in KrakPlot (Krackhardt 1994) (Cummings J. and
Cross R. 2003). The performance level of the groups was measured by two methods (Cummings
J. and Cross R. 2003). First, the groups were rated by senior managers on seven dimensions:
teamwork, clearly defined problem selection, appropriateness of method used to solve the
problem, innovativeness of remedies used to solve the problem, quality of impact from results,
institutionalization of solution, and clarity of presentation. Second, members of the group rated
the group’s performance based on three dimensions: efficiency of team performance, adherence
to schedule and budget, and production of excellent work. The study’s results fully supported
the hypothesis that hierarchical structures, while controlling for mean levels of communication,
reduce group performance for complex problems (Cummings J. and Cross R. 2003). The results
supporting the hypothesis were true for both manager ratings of performance and peer
evaluations. These results support the belief that increasing the lateral communication of groups
can result in higher group performance. Increasing lateral communication to increase group
performance is especially true in complex non-routine work (Cummings J. and Cross R. 2003).
A strength of the study is the clear empirical linkage between hierarchy and group performance.
Two caveats need to be kept in mind when attempting to apply these results. First, as with most
surveys, the data was incomplete, but several analyses where conducted on data sets with varying
degrees of completeness which led the researchers to believe the data was still reliable
(Cummings J. and Cross R. 2003). Second, the study was conducted using only groups which
had been selected for the rewards and recognition program and thus were already labeled as
successful (Cummings J. and Cross R. 2003). This success could be a result of processes or
culture of the parent organization. This is mitigated though by the fact that since all the groups
were from one organization, comparisons of the group are more complete.
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As a compliment to Cummings and Cross’s work above, Shaw (1964) reviewed the
literature of his time and believed it supported the idea that decentralized networks produced
better performance when trying to solve problems that not only required the collection of
information, but also required some action on the information in order to accomplish the group’s
objective (Shaw 1964). Shaw made two observations based on his research that supported the
idea that decentralization would increase performance. First, the central person in the
experiment was overloaded with information and work and could not properly perform the task.
Second, the periphery members of the group were not willing to blindly accept the work
accomplished by the central person (Shaw 1964). While Shaw’s experiments used relatively
small groups allowing a simpler calculation of network centralization, later work was conducted
by other researchers on a much larger group and the network centralization level was calculated
using UCINET IV© (Sparrowe R. T. 2001). The centralization of the network was calculated by
analyzing the centrality score of each individual in the network. The sum of the differences
between the highest centrality score and the other centrality scores was calculated. This value
was then divided by the maximum possible sum of differences (Wasserman, S. and Faust, K.
1994). This calculation of network centralization focuses on the network as a whole and note
individual centrality. By analyzing the network level of centralization it is possible to remove
some of the bias associated with individual inputs and place more emphasis on the interactions of
the group.

Structural Holes and Closure
The second predictor of team performance used in this study is the complimentary
application of Structural Holes and Closure as summarized by Burt (2001). Structural Holes
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occur in a network when one node connects multiple other nodes which themselves are not
connected, Figure 6. The connecting node is both in a position to broker information flow
between the non-connected nodes and allows the connecting node to have access to information
from non-redundant sources (Burt 2001). The relationship between the brokering node and the
non-connected nodes is beneficial because the supply of information from separate sources
provides innovative ideas, along with different skill sets which could be beneficial to solving the
problem at hand (Burt 2001).

Figure 6, Structural Hole, adapted from Burt, 2001

In the figure above, Burt believes the sociogram on the left this structure will produce a better
performing network due to the advantages created by the structural hole. This structure is also
useful, especially in a military or emergency management setting since receiving the same piece
of information from non-connected sources adds credence to the validity of that information. At
the very least, if there are differences in the information being transmitted, then those differences
can be used to zero in on the true meaning of the information. For example, if an EOC receives
reports from sources A, B, and C that there is gunfire coming from a location in varying
directions from those sources, those directions can be used to triangulate a more probable
location for the gunfire than if there was just one source. The measurement of structural holes is
accomplished by computing the betweenness centrality score of a network. Betweenness
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centrality is itself an indicator of group performance in knowledge intensive work. A study
conducted by Cross and Cummings (2004) fully supported the idea that the presence of structural
holes will predict high performance. Their study surveyed workers in both a petrochemical plant
and a strategy-consulting firm (Cross R. and Cummings J. 2004). Two surveys were used to
gather the data. For the betweenness centrality metric the second survey was used to collect
links within a bounded network. The data was then interpreted using the flow betweenness
measure in UCINET 6©. Betweenness centrality was used since it measures the degree to which
one node is between other nodes (Cross R. and Cummings J. 2004). This position of
betweenness was shown to be beneficial to a node or person since it allows for the possibility to
control the flow between other people in the network. It could also allow access to multiple
streams of information from multiple sources providing innovative ideas to help in problem
solving (Cross R. and Cummings J. 2004). One of the strengths of this research was the use of
two different organizations which each provided similar findings (Cross R. and Cummings J.
2004). As with all research, there are some limitations to their conclusions. Their study focused
on complex and unusual work and the results could not necessarily be applied to routine work
tasks. Since this study on EOC interoperability deals with work that is complex and is rarely
repetitive, Cross and Cummings (2004) work can be applied. Also, the measure of an
individual’s performance is from only one source, but that source is constructed from several
references including peer evaluations, billable hours and supervisor project ratings (Cross R. and
Cummings J. 2004). As a result of their work, it should be possible to rate the performance of
two networks based on the betweenness centrality scores of similar nodes within the two
networks.
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The complement to structural holes in a network is network closure or density. Usually
measured by the density of the network, closure shows how connected the nodes are to each
other, Figure 7 (Burt 2001). Closure in a network allows more efficient, faster, and accurate
spread of information through a network due to the fact that all or most of the nodes are
connected to each other providing a short path for information to flow (Coleman 1990).

Figure 7, Closure, adapted from Burt, 2001

Based on these ideas it is argued that the denser a network is the better its performance (Coleman
1990).
With both the structural hole and closure theories defined, Burt (2001) attempted to
integrate them into one cohesive philosophy. Based on many years of research by Burt,
Coleman, and others, both structural holes and closure have been shown to affect performance.
The manner in which they interact is best presented using a figure developed by Burt (2001),
Figure 8.
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Figure 8, Structural Hole versus Closure, adapted from Burt, 2001

Performance can be affected by both structural holes and closure in a network. If there are
minimal connections to non-redundant source of information outside of the group, then
performance will suffer as shown on the vertical axis. Also, if there are minimal connections
within the group, the performance will also suffer, as shown on the horizontal axis. The peak of
performance is obtained by maximizing the number of structural holes the group spans and by
sharing that diverse information within the group through a very dense network of connections,
or closure.

Summary
As a result of the previous work accomplished in the field of SNA provided above, it is
relevant to use these measures to determine the structure of an EOC network. Once the structure
is know it can be analyzed to find similarities and inconsistencies between organizations that are
working under the same guidance and responding to the same crisis. By evaluating the measures
of, centralized (hierarchical) versus decentralized structure, and structural holes/betweenness
centrality in combination with closure, we avail ourselves of well supported measures to predict
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the performance of an EOC. If two EOCs who intend to work together during a crisis have
different values for centralization or betweenness centrality and closure then it is possible that
the two EOCs could have difficulty with interoperability. It is not necessary to change one EOC
to match the other, but just being aware of the differences and training to mitigate their affects or
communicating one EOC’s logic for accepting such a network is key to increasing
interoperability. Also, the visual inspection of the network provided by the theories put forth by
Dekker (2002) and Houghton, et al (2006) allow us to view the EOC by its archetype and the
benefits and drawbacks associated with each archetype. Add to these measures and archetypes
the work of McMaster, et al (2005) where the network is altered to a structure that produces an
archetype more applicable to the given environment and not only can you predict the
performance of the network but provide ways to adjust it to possibly increase performance and
interoperability.
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III. Methodology

Population
The population for this analysis was comprised of two main groups, those in an AF EOC
and those in civilian EOCs. The purpose of the two separate groups was to provide the ability to
compare and contrast the social networks created by both groups. Since the NRF provides a
standard organizational structure for all EOCs, it should be possible to directly compare the
networks of both groups since they are built upon the same premise.
The AF EOCs were chosen by first reviewing Inspector General (IG) reports conducted
on the bases in question since 2004. The actual score of the inspection was of no interest. The
focus was on whether or not the base was inspected on its implementation of the EOC concept.
Since the EOC concept was a new introduction to AF command and control this review of IG
reports ensured that the base had implemented the concept and had been inspected on its
concepts. It stands to reason that if the base was tested on the EOC structure then they have at
least a minimum level of experience and knowledge about the EOC structure and their inputs
from the survey will be beneficial. Additionally the only bases considered were bases that were
located in the United States and not in a foreign country. While the AF EOC concept is meant to
be applied across the entire AF in both peacetime and wartime command and control situations it
was necessary to limit the selection to stateside bases in order to maintain the comparison to
civilian EOCs. Civilian emergency response structures and procedures in foreign countries do
not necessarily abide by the guidance of the NRF and NIMS. Ten AF bases were selected based
on this process (see
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Table 3). These bases represent four different AF Major Commands (MAJCOMs) including
Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), Air Combat Command (ACC), Air Force Material Command
(AFMC), and Air Mobility Command (AMC). Each has different capabilities and focuses.
Briefly, PACAF is responsible for command and control of all AF bases in the Pacific region and
for combat capabilities in that area. ACC provides command and control for several bases in the
continental US and provides combat capability to theater commanders. AMC provides
command and control to several continental US bases as well, and provides the majority of the
AF’s air transportation capabilities. Finally, AFMC’s mission is focused on acquisition, service,
logistics and research, development, testing, and evaluation of AF systems. There are several
other MAJCOMs in the AF but access to their IG reports was not available so their bases were
excluded from the population. One caveat to this process is the selection of Wright Patterson
AFB. The IG reports for this base were not accessed but based on several visits to the EOC it
was obvious that the EOC concept was fully implemented.
MAJCOM
ACC
ACC
ACC
ACC
ACC
AFMC
AMC
PACAF
PACAF
PACAF

AF Base
Langley
Barksdale
Minot
Mountain Home
Whiteman
Wright Patterson
McGuire
Hickam
Eielson
Elmendorf

Table 3, USAF Bases Surveyed

The civilian EOCs were chosen partially due to ease of geographical access and partially
based on conversations and interviews with the local county EM Director. Four civilian EOCs
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were selected for the study. The first is the Montgomery County EOC which is located in
Dayton, OH and is responsible for all of Montgomery county. Being a county EOC they provide
a bridge between small to medium city, town, and village EOCs in the county and the state EOC.
The second EOC is Hamilton County EOC which is located in Cincinnati, OH. The Hamilton
County EOC is a regional EOC coordinating the efforts of several larger EOCs in the greater
Cincinnati Area and is enrolled in the DHS Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). Due to its
size, location and participation in the UASI Hamilton EOC has access to a relatively large budget
as compared to the other civilian EOCs with possibly the exception of the Ohio State EOC.
Also, based on budget, urban location, and size of responsibilities Hamilton EOC is comparable
to a typical large city EOC. Franklin County EOC is responsible for the county which
encompasses Columbus OH, which is also the state capitol. Finally, the Ohio State EOC was
asked to participate in the survey.

Survey
A survey was used to gather the necessary relational data in order to perform a SNA. The
survey was based on work by Valdis Krebs. The entire survey can be found in Appendix A.
Questions one through four on the survey gathered background data which includes; to which
EOC organizational position the recipient is assigned, how many times (both actual and exercise)
they have been a part of the EOC during its activation, how long they have been involved in EM
duties, to which EOC position they are primarily assigned and if they are assigned to alternate
EOC positions. The next three questions in the survey gather the data necessary for the SNA.
The first question attempts to develop a task network by asking the recipient:
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On the following scale please select the frequency you would need to
communicate with each ESF or function listed below during the crisis event, in
order to exchange information, documents, schedules, and other resources to get
your job done? (For the first two questions in each of the following sections, use
your ESF or organizational block to report communications internal to your unit.
For example I am in ESF 3, and for the ESF 3 block below I will report how often
I communicate with my own unit.)
The second question develops a decision network by asking the recipient:
On the following scale please select the frequency you would need to
communicate with each ESF or function listed below during the crisis event, in
order to seek inputs, advice, and opinions before making a key decision?
The third question gathers data on what tools the respective EOC position uses to exchange
information by asking:
On the following scale please select the frequency you would need to use the
information tools below, to exchange information, documents, schedules, and
other resources to get your job done during the crisis event?
The choices of tools available for the recipient were derived from a study conducted by Air
Force Space Command (Robillard, J. and Sambrook, R., 2008). The intent of the study was to
understand the needs of AF personnel who would use a computer based system, like WebEOC®,
to manage information during a crisis event. Out of the 18 tools available in the survey (
Table 4) seven are directly from the medium and high priority region of the Robillard/Sambrook
study. The medium/high priority region identifies information management tools that are a high
priority for user who participated in the study. An additional eight items from the medium/high
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region are incorporated into the tools on the survey through generalization and combination. Out
of the 26 items in the medium/high region identified by the Robillard/Sambrook study, 15 are
available as tools in the third question above. The 11 tools used in this survey not from the
medium/high region of the Robillard/Sambrook study are included to provide some contrasting
choices and to identify use of legacy systems such as paper trails and dry erase status boards. As
with the choices for communication among the EOC positions the recipient has the opportunity
to add their own inputs through three “other” blocks.

Online Chat

Net Based checklist
management

Net Based Personnel
Accounting (including DIM
counts)

"Digital
Dashboard"

Net Based Regulations, AFIs,
Policy, Guidance, Forms,
ERG, NIMS forms/protocols

Personnel Accounting on
Paper (including DIM counts)

Mission status
reporting

Net Based Mapping tool
(including cordons, icons,
plume models, alerts and other
event plotting)

Face to Face Communication

Dry Erase Status Boards

Cell phone Voice

Net Based Event Log

Cell phone text message

Net Based Current and
Forecasted Weather
Conditions

Cell phone Instant Talk

Land line
Telephone
Damage
Assessment
Radio

Other 1 Fill in
the blank

Other 2

Other 3

Table 4, Information Management Tools Surveyed

The scale referenced by the questions is a Likert scale ranging in value from zero to five
and containing the verbiage from Never, Very Rarely, Rarely, Occasionally, Frequently, and
Very Frequently. In order to reduce confusion the survey recipient will not see the values
assigned to each word so that the values are not confused with the actual number of times
communication happens. The values will be assigned to the choice made by the recipient and
represent the weight of the connection.
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The EOC positions identified on the survey cover the standard 15 Emergency Support
Functions outlined in the NRF along with EOC Director and Manager positions, Wing
Commander/Executive Office, Incident Commander, and Other which allows the recipient to add
in their own position, Table 5.

ESF #1: Transportation
(LRS)

ESF #2:
Communications (CS)
ESF #3: Public Works
and Engineering (CES)
ESF #4: Firefighting
(Fire Emergency
Services)
ESF #5: Emergency
Management (CE
Emergency
Management)

ESF #6: Mass Care,
Emergency Assistance,
Housing, and Human
Services (SVS)

ESF #11: Agriculture
and Natural Resources
(MDG)

EOC Manager

ESF #12: Energy (CES)

EOC Director

ESF #13: Public Safety
and Security (SFS)

Incident Commander
(On Scene)

ESF #9: Search and
Rescue (CES)

ESF #14: Long-Term
Community Recovery
(CES)

Wing
Commander/Executive
Official

ESF #10: Oil and
Hazardous Materials
Response (CES)

ESF #15: External
Affairs (PA)

Other

ESF #7: Logistics
Management and
Resource Support
(LRS)
ESF #8: Public Health
and Medical Services
(MDG)

Table 5, EOC Positions Surveyed

In order to ensure the results are comparable across organizations a single scenario was
developed from which the recipients will base their responses. The scenario is purposely vague
in order to allow the recipients the opportunity to apply the breadth and depth of their
experiences. The basis for the scenario is a CBRNE attack outside an AF installation that
quickly overwhelms the local responders. Assistance from the AF base is requested and
approved. The scenario contains information about the initial, sustained, and recovery response
phases.
“A CBRNE event has occurred directly outside of the local military installation and
within the area of responsibility for the local civilian responders. Civilian emergency response
assets respond and the base has been requested and approved to lend whatever support is
43

necessary. Information is sparse but assume any or multiple CBRNE events have occurred and
there might be recurring attacks. There is severe damage to local infrastructure and a mass
casualty situation. Assume the Red Cross and other applicable non-government organizations
will be responding and that the response process will last for several days.
The EOC is formed and progressed through the stages of the crisis event. Information
was slow to come in. Initially there are no reports of cordons, casualties or extent of damage.
The beginning of the incident lacked information and details.
As the event progressed first responders arrived on scene and performed their missions.
Follow on emergency response forces and reserve forces were called in to quantify and qualify
the incident. Cordons were secured and evacuations were completed. Casualties were processed
and transported from the scene.
All major life, property, and environmental saving efforts were mostly completed and the
situation is approaching a stable, steady state of operations. There is still heavy damage and
contamination that needs to be dealt with and some search and recovery operations are still
ongoing.”

Analysis Tool
The results from the last three questions of the survey will be entered into several
adjacency matrices for analysis using the social network program UCINET 6 © (Borgatti,
Everett, and Freeman, 2002). From UCINET 6 ©, a sociogram will be constructed in order to
review the structure of the network and compare it to the archetypes proposed by Dekker (2002)
and expose the structure to possible manipulations to improve network flow (McMaster, Baber,
& Houghton, 2005). Also UCINET 6 © will be used to produce several SNA metrics including
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network centralization, betweenness centrality, and density (closure). These metrics will be used
to compare the sociograms of different organizations including an averaged AF EOC structure
which takes responses from all bases and combines them into a single network and a similar
sociogram from the combined responses of the civilian EOCs.
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IV. Analysis

Once collected, the data presented some limitations for analysis. The network turned out
to be very complicated and interconnected. This resulted in an inability to visually analyze the
sociograms or manipulate them into different archetypes (Dekker, 2002) (McMaster, Baber, &
Houghton, 2005). Due to the complexity of the networks, SNA metrics were used to analyze and
compare the networks. Finally, due to the limited response to the survey, only a combined
civilian network and a combined AF network were constructed. The distribution of the survey
was only semi-controlled. Points of contact were found at the locations where the survey was to
be distributed. The survey was then sent to those POCs via a web link and they were asked to
distribute the survey to the personnel in their EOCs. There was 119 data points collected but
only 97 were usable after the data was prepared for analysis. There was not enough data to break
the networks down into individual networks representing singular EOCs. This being said the
data provided significant results concerning the SNA metrics of centrality, in and out closeness
in addition to flow betweenness, and network level measures of closeness and flow betweenness.

Preparing the Data
As with most data gathered by surveys there are limitations that must be taken into
account. The intent of the survey was to capture data from both military and civilian EOCs in
order to map the entire EOC network. The ideal situation would have been to receive data points
from all 19 positions in the EOC from all ten bases and all four civilian EOCs.
Before the survey was fielded, two positions were removed due to difficulty identifying
personnel to respond in those positions, Wing Commander/Executive Official and Incident
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Commander. This left 17 EOC positions based mainly on the recommended EOC structure in
the NRF (NRF, 2008). Instead of all 17 EOC positions identified in the survey, data was
received from the EOC Manager (identified as item 16 in the data set), EOC Director (item 17 in
the data set), and 13 of 15 ESFs, ESF 9 (Search and Rescue) and ESF 12 (Energy) had no
responses, providing data on 15 of the 19 EOC positions. Figure 9 provides a graphical
representation of the EOC positions that responded. If the EOC network is defined by using the
15 ESFs and the EOC Manager and Director then the survey gathered data on 88% of the
network. This is an acceptable network since the Executive Officer and Incident Commander are
usually physically located outside of the EOC and have primary responsibilities different from
the EOC. While they are part of a larger emergency response network which includes not only
them but the EOC, other command and control centers and responders on scene, it is logical to
remove them from the EOC network in order to isolate network characteristics specific to the
EOC. By utilizing this assumption and surveying 88% of the desired EOC network, most SNA
techniques can be utilized since more than 80% of the network was surveyed and SNA requires a
high response rate (Wasserman, S. and Faust, K., 1994), (Sparrowe R. T., 2001). The figure
below details the level of responses from each of the 17 EOC positions surveyed.
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Frequency

ESF Frequency
20
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16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
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All
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Civ

Bins (ESF)

Figure 9, ESF Response Frequency

The y-axis details the number of responses received from personnel who occupy their respective
EOC position. The x-axis lists those EOC positions. The first bar in the series is a summation of
all respondents, the second bar is just military respondents and the third bar is only civilian
respondents. The total number of responses from military and civilian EOC positions differed;
later figures present the data after it has been normalized.
When the data is broken into military and civilian responses the percent of the network
surveyed falls to 76.5%. It is necessary to separate the responses into these two categories in
order to compare the networks. Since this is exploratory research the slightly lower percentage
will be accepted but the conclusions drawn should be applied with caution, again since SNA
requires high response rates in order to properly depict the connections within the network
(Wasserman, S. and Faust, K., 1994).
It should also be noted that the missing EOC positions of the network differ between the
military and civilian breakouts. In the military network responses from ESFs 11 (Agriculture
and Natural Resources) and 14 (Long Term Community Recovery) are missing, while in the
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civilian network responses from ESFs 3 (Public Works and Engineering) and 4 (Firefighting) are
missing. Even though these ESFs are missing from the network their affect can still be partly
analyzed since other EOC positions responded with their interaction with the missing ESFs.
Some of the 119 data points collected had to be removed from the analysis, but every
attempt was made to maintain unbiased and valid data. First, the answers to the question, “To
which ESF are you assigned?” were reviewed. In several cases the respondents did not answer
the question. By using answers provided in the “alternate ESF position assigned” column, some
of the non-responses to the first question were resolved. The non-responses to the primary ESF
assigned question where resolved in the following manner. If only one alternate ESF position
was selected and no primary ESF position was selected, the alternate ESF position was used to
fill in the lack of response to the primary ESF position. If multiple ESF Alternate positions were
selected or if no answer was provided for either primary or alternate ESF position then that data
point was removed from the data set. Also, there were a couple of data points where respondents
“wrote in” the ESF position to which they are assigned since it was not one of the standard
options in the survey. Since there were only two such data points they were included in the
demographic analysis of the data, such as ESF response frequency, level of experience, and
number of EOC events participated in. The “write-in” EOC positions were not included in the
task and decision network analysis. The “write in” responses were in the military network and
represented the Judge Advocate office and the Airfield Management office.
Next the responses to the questions which define the task and decision network were
reviewed. Again, in several cases the respondents did not answer any of the questions in either
the task or decision section. The data points resulting from these responses were deleted from
the data set. Also, if the data point only included an answer for interaction between the ESF and
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itself it was deleted from the data set. For example, if a respondent answered that they fill the
ESF 4 position and then failed to answer any of the task or decision network questions except the
one that details how they interact within their own ESF/organization then that data point was
deleted. In every other case, any interaction between ESFs that was not answered was assumed
to be no interaction and was coded as a zero. Finally, there were a couple of data points where
the respondent answered the task network questions or the decision network questions but not
both. In those cases the data point was used in the analysis where answers were provided.
Finally, in the demographic data, several data points reflected 20+ years of experiences.
In order to complete a numerical analysis the “20+” was converted to “20”. Also, several
respondents listed an estimated range for the number of EOC events in which they participated.
In these cases the maximum value in the range was used for analysis.
Overall the task and decision networks along with the demographic analysis below were
the result of 97 responses. The military network was composed of 57 responses while the
civilian network was composed of 40 responses.

Background Data
In order to better understand the results produced by the SNA two main areas of
demographic data was collected. The first area was event frequency. This data was gathered by
asking how many times the respondent was part of the EOC during an activation. This included
both actual events and training exercises. Several metrics were used to provide insight into both
networks. These included total number of events from all respondents, the average number of
events, and the standard deviation.
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There was one anomaly in the data set. In the military network one response showed 150
EOC events attended. When compared with all other responses it was an order of magnitude
larger. For this reason the data point was left out of the demographic analysis,
Table 6, Demographic Data, but the data point was included in the histogram charts below
and the SNA since the data point could easily be identified in the histogram and would not skew
the SNA.
The second area of demographic data was measured in years of experience. The same
characteristics were computed for experience as events attended.
Table 6 compares the raw data for both networks. Figures 10, 11, and 12 present a
normalized view of the data since the data populations differed in size, 57 for the military
network and 40 for the civilian network. The first bar in the figures represents the military
population while the second bar is the civilian population.
Military Civilian
Event
Total Events
569.00
Average Events
10.35
Mode
12.00
Median
8.00
Variance
75.42
Standard Deviation
8.68
Experience
Total Experience (yrs)
362.08
Average Experience (yrs)
6.35
Mode
3.00
Median
3.50
Variance
35.65
Standard Deviation
5.97
Table 6, Demographic Data
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355.00
8.88
4.00
6.00
49.80
7.06
413.08
10.33
20.00
8.96
41.22
6.42

Normalized ESF Frequency
0.250
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Frequency
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ESF 10 (HazMat)

ESF 9 (SAR)
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ESF 7 (Log)

ESF 6 (Mass Care)
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Bins, EOC Positions

Figure 10, Normalized ESF Frequency
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Figure 11, Normalized Event Frequency
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Figure 12, Normalized Experience Frequency

SNA Data Preparation
After the background data was analyzed the SNA began. Two types of networks were
viewed, a task network and a decision network. The military version of both the task and
decision network was compared to its civilian counterpart. Again the data needed to be
organized in order to conduct the analysis. Since some ESFs have multiple responses in the data
set they must be averaged together so that they will compare equally to those ESFs who had only
one response.
After the ESF responses are controlled for number of responses they were coded by
dichotomizing the data. The average response for level of interaction from all respondents
ranged from a value of 1.78 to 2.5. This led to a level of interaction equal to two, being used as a
decision point. All responses with an interaction of two or less were coded as no interaction and
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all responses claiming an interaction of three or more were coded as an interaction or connection
between ESF nodes.

Network Key players
The first metric used to compare the networks is closeness centrality, which will be
referred to as closeness for the remainder of this thesis. The metric was calculated using
UCINET 6 © (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, 2002), specifically, the closeness centrality
command based on Freeman’s geodesic distances. This process is a sum of the shortest paths
from one node to all other nodes. Since this network is not symmetrical the program computed
both an in- and out-closeness. In-closeness can be thought of as connections coming into node A
from node B but not necessarily reciprocated from node A to node B. Another way to view the
relationship is that in-closeness represents how close a node is to all other nodes when
information is coming into the node from the network. Conversely, out-closeness measures how
close a node is to all other nodes in the network when information is going out of the node into
the network. The larger the closeness score the closer the node is to all other nodes in the
network. For example several nodes scored a value of 100. In this network this represents a
connection to every other node in the network, which means the node can reach all other nodes
in just one step. In order to identify key players based on closeness scores, a break point was
calculated in each network by finding the mean closeness value and adding the standard
deviation for the network (Houghton, et al, 2006). All nodes with values greater than the mean
plus one standard deviation were labeled as key players. These key players were then compared
between networks.
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The results of in-closeness in the task networks, dichotomized at a decision point of two,
are presented in Table 7 .
Military Task
Node
In
11
21.92
Centrality
14
22.86
(Key Players)
9
23.53
Breakpoint
21.46
Network
Closeness
index (NCI)
2.54

Civilian Task
Node
In
9
22.54
4
23.88
3
24.24
22.03

2.74

Table 7, In-Closeness Task Network

Both the military and civilian task networks had three ESF nodes as key players. While no data
was collected from several of the key players in Table 7 the results are still valid as explained in
the next paragraph. ESFs 9 (Search and Rescue), 14(Long Term Recovery), and 11(Agriculture
and Natural Resources) were key players in the military task network, while ESFs 3(Public
Works), 4(Firefighting), and 9(Search and Rescue) were key players in the civilian task network.
The ESFs are listed from highest in-closeness score to lowest. The fact that the analysis shows
only one ESF in common between the networks and that the ESF was the highest in-closeness
scorer in the military network, while the third highest scorer, just above the break point, in the
civilian network could lead us to believe the networks would handle the given scenario in
different manners since different ESFs play the central roles. Again, the in-closeness metric
demonstrates very direct flows coming into the node leading us to believe ESF 9 in the military
network and ESF 3 in the civilian network are the nodes in the network that are most often
contacted by other network nodes to exchange information, documents, schedules and other
resources in order for the other network nodes to accomplish their task.
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It is important to note here that no responses on the survey tool were received from ESF 9
and no military responses were received from ESFs 11 and 14, while no civilian responses were
received from ESFs 3 and 4. This is important because all of these ESFs are key players in the
in-closeness metric. While this is an interesting occurrence, the in-closeness metric measures
how close a node is to other nodes for information flow coming into the node and isn’t
necessarily affected by a lack of response from the node itself. The metric is derived from the
responses of the other nodes saying they interact with ESFs 9, 11, 14, 3, and 4.
The second results reviewed are for the out-closeness of the task network dichotomized at
two. The results can be seen in Table 8.
Military Task
Node
Out
Centrality
(Key Players)
Breakpoint
Network
Closeness
index (NCI)

4
16

100
100
95.58

2.72

Civilian Task
Node
Out
2
100
5
100
13
100
16
100
98.78

2.13

Table 8, Out-Closeness Task Network

In this case the military network only has two key players while the civilian network has four.
Again only one node is common between the two networks but this time it shares the highest
out-closeness score in both networks. It is interesting to see that in the out-closeness metric
Node 16 (EOC Manager) has a score of 100 meaning it is only one step away from every other
node in the network when it comes to interacting with other nodes in the network in order to
accomplish a task. This seems to represent common logic that the EOC manager would
regularly interact with all other nodes due to a possible supervisory position.
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A similar analysis was conducted on the in- and out-closeness scores in the decision
network, also dichotomized at two. The results are detailed in, Table 9.

Centrality
(Key Players)
Breakpoint
Network
Closeness
index (NCI)

Civilian Decision
Node
Out

Military Decision
Node
In
12
21.33
11
22.22
14
22.22
9
22.86
21.16

Civilian Decision
Node
In
12
21.62
4
22.86
9
22.86
3
23.19
21.52

Military Decision
Node
Out

87.47

94.96

2.46

2.42

3.85

3.00

7
16

100
100

5
13
16

100
100
100

Table 9, In/Out-Closeness Decision Network

The key player scores in the in-closeness decision network are almost identical to those in the incloseness task network. There is a slight difference in the order of the key players in the civilian
network and the inclusion of a fourth key player, ESF 12 (Energy). Again due to the presence of
different nodes in the key player set it is possible to conclude that the civilian and military
networks would handle the given scenario each in a different way.
Additionally, the fact that the in/out-closeness key player nodes are almost identical in
both the task and decision networks might indicate a short coming in the survey instrument. It is
possible that the survey population didn’t accurately differentiate between the given task and
network questions. The affect of this should be limited since the other metrics, used below to
describe the network, do not show a similar problem.
In the out closeness network Node 16 (EOC Manager) is again prominently placed in the
key player set. This is to be expected based on their role managing the EOC operations. It might
be expected that Node 17 (EOC Director) would also be a key player in the out-closeness
decision network. While Node 17 is not in the key player set it fell just short of the break point
with an out-closeness score of 80 and 88.8 in the military and civilian networks, respectively.
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Network Closeness Index
The second metric used to describe the networks is the network closeness index (NCI).
The NCI is calculated by summing the differences between the maximum closeness score and all
other closeness scores then dividing by the maximum closeness score (Borgatti, Everett, and
Freeman, 2002). Using UCINET 6 © the network was viewed as not connected due to infinite
distances so the NCI was computed via a spreadsheet using the closeness values derived in
UCINET 6 ©. This value can then be used to compare the level of centralization between the
networks. In an all-channel network, that is one where every node is connected to every other
node directly the NCI would equal zero (Freeman, 1977). Therefore the closer the NCI is to zero
the more decentralized the network. As the literature supported, the more decentralized the
network the more likely it will be a high performing network for non-routine, complex tasks
(Shaw, 1964) (Cummings J. and Cross R., 2003), (Sparrowe R. T., 2001).
Based on the data gathered here the networks with the lowest NCI, and thus the most
decentralized, are the civilian out-closeness task network (2.12), the civilian in-closeness
decision network (2.42), and the military in-closeness decision network (2.46). The NCI for all
networks can be seen in Tables Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9. When comparing networks, the
military and civilian in-closeness decision networks are very close, relatively, in their NCI and
are ranked second and third above. This can be interpreted to mean that when nodes in the
network are being asked for inputs before making a decision the network is very decentralized.
Meanwhile, the out-closeness decision network has the two highest NCIs, meaning it is the most
centralized of the networks. This can be interpreted to mean that when nodes are asking for
inputs in making a decision the network is more centralized.
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Flow Betweenness Centrality
The third metric used to characterize the networks is flow betweenness centrality (FBC),
also referenced as betweenness centrality in the literature. FBC is a measure of the degree to
which one node is between other nodes (Cross R. and Cummings J., 2004). It is also a good
indicator of structural holes in a network and can be used to compare similar nodes between
networks and is supported as an indicator of well performing networks (Burt, 2001) (Cross R.
and Cummings J., 2004). UCINET 6 © was used to compute the FBC, and assumes that nodes
will use the all the paths that connect them but in a manner that is proportional to the path length
(Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, 2002). It is important to note that UCINET 6 © computes the
FBC in a slightly different manner than past versions. Also, as the network size and density
increase so will the FBC (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, 2002). Therefore a normalized value
is also computed, nFBC. Table 10 presents the FBC values for the networks, along with the
network flow betweenness index (NFBI).
Military Task
Node
nFBC
Flow
Betweenness
Centrality
(Key Players)
Breakpoint
NFBI

4
7
2

20.77
33.97
36.91
18.76
31.32

Civilian Task
Node
nFBC

8

9.44
8.15
4.68

Military Decision
Node
nFBC
16
11.69
17
13.06
3
14.76
7
20.73
11.42
16.28

Civilian Decision
Node
nFBC
8
16
5

10.52
10.95
15.55
9.87
10.72

Table 10, Flow Betweenness Centrality

The data shows that only the decision network has a node in common, node 16 (EOC
Manager). Since flow betweenness shows which nodes connections within the network funnel
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through, it can be interpreted that civilian and military networks have different nodes that act as
control points and thus would respond to the given scenario in different ways.

Network Flow Betweenness Index
The NFBI is a measure, in percent, of how many connections can be made between nodes
without an intermediary (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, 2002). The lower the percentage the
more connections can be made without an intermediary, so there are less structural holes. In the
current data set it can be seen that NFBI has a reciprocal correlation to NCI. This makes sense
since a decentralized network would have few nodes which control the connections within the
network. Military networks, both task and decision, score higher than their civilian counter
parts, 31.32 and 16.28 respectively. Although the difference between the NFBI score in the
decision network is much less drastic than the task network. A possible explanation for this is
the strong presence of the military chain of command. This could drive certain nodes in the
network to act as supervisory nodes which control the flow of the network. This could also
explain the presence of nodes 16 (EOC manager) and 17 (EOC director) in the military decision
making network.

Results
The results of this data are very exciting. While the data shows there are several areas
where EOC interoperability might not be maximized the specific incongruencies are identified
and can at least be understood and at best resolved through increased communication between
EOC and a maturation of the NRF system. The interpretation of the above data can reveal
several characteristics of the EOC networks. With this new understanding, the networks can
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then begin to adapt themselves in order to improve joint operations. Overall, several differences
can be seen between the two networks which could serve to decrease congruency when the
networks must work together during a crisis. Specifically, attention should be given to the lack
of similar key players between networks when comparing closeness scores and FBC scores.
However, with the exception of the comparison between the military and civilian out-closeness
task network NCI score the other networks all have similar NCI scores.
When comparing the key players of both networks for both closeness and FBC it is
clearly evident that the networks have very few key players in common. It would be expected
that given the same scenario in the survey questionnaire, and the fact that both military and
civilian EOCs are expected to adopt the NRF in order to manage a crisis, that both EOCs would
have similar key players because they would handle the scenario in a similar manner. This is
clearly not the case in this study. This lack of similar key players could cause the respective
EOCs to respond differently to common scenarios and in a joint environment the incongruencies
caused could lead to confusion, time delays, duplication of efforts, and a reduced level of
performance. Understanding the differences between cooperating EOCs should be a high
priority for emergency managers and other members of the EOC.
When studying the network level characteristics of the networks including NCI and NFBI
the analysis begins to show a few more commonalities. Specifically, when viewing the NCI
values it can be seen that the military and civilian in-closeness decision networks share a very
similar NCI. They rank as second and third most decentralized networks in the study. This can
tell us that while they have different key players the actual flow of information within the
network is similar. When it comes to collecting information in order to make a decision the
network is very flat and each node in the network is closely connected to all other nodes in the
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network allowing very easy access to multiple sources of information. Intuitively, this is a good
structure for making decisions. It shows that decisions are not made in a vacuum and that EOC
members are not afraid to interact with other EOC members in order to make the best decision
possible. Despite different key players the networks flow information in a similar manner
leading to a belief that the incongruencies apparent in the key player analysis could be the result
of a difference between EOC position names and actual duties. For example, ESF 14 is a key
player in the military in-closeness decision network while ESF 3 is a key player in the civilian
network. While both have different names because the information flow in the networks is
similar they could be performing similar duties. More study on actual EOC position duties’
would be necessary to increase an understanding of this phenomenon. The comparison of the
military and civilian out-closeness decision network again shows similarities in NCI values.
This time the NCI is very high leading to the belief that the networks are very centralized. This
also makes intuitive sense especially when considering the EOC manager key player and the
closeness of the EOC director to being a key player. When the decision is made and the
information must be disseminated the network is very centralized showing that all the
information comes from a single source. It can still be shared among EOC members but coming
from a single source ensures that the same message is sent to everyone in the EOC directly.
Finally, when viewing the NFBI values the differences between military and civilian
EOCs are again apparent. The military networks show a strong presence of structural holes
while the civilian networks do not. The presence or absence of structural holes versus a
decentralized network should not be solely classified as a positive or negative. Different
environments and demographics could account for the presence or absence of these measures.
For example, based on the data in Figure 12 it is evident that civilian EOCs have a higher
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number of years of experience. This could lead to more decentralized network working very
well if we assume years of experience equate to skill. Whereas in a military network there is less
overall experience so the presence of more structural holes might be necessary to compensate for
the lower level of experience and possibly skill. This is not to say that military EOCs lack the
capabilities to execute their mission just that the disbursement of that skill is not as wide, so a
more directive approach in the EOC is necessary to accomplish the mission.

Limitations
This thesis is constrained by the data it analyzes. As with all data gathered by surveys
there is the possibility of misunderstanding and differing interpretations of the questions asked.
The strength of the survey could be improved which could remove some of the possibly
repetitive results found when comparing key players using the closeness metric. Also, the use of
a Likert scale could skew the data. The scale could be interpreted differently by each survey
respondent. It would be more accurate, but time consuming, to directly and numerically measure
the interactions between EOC personnel. This could be accomplished through direct observation
during exercises or access to the multiple communication methods used to interact in order to
count the interactions such as recorded phone, email, or radio communications.
Another limitation of this study is the close locality present in the civilian EOCs versus
the dispersed nature of the military EOCs. The intent was to gather general data that could be
applied to all EOCs. This intent was based on the adherence to the NRFs guidelines for
organizing and operating an EOC. Due to the infancy of the EOC structure more localized data
collection might provide better results until the NRF can be incorporated on a wider basis. The
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local data collection and analysis could also provide more direct results to those surveyed when
compared to their neighboring EOCs.
As is seen in Figure 10, the responses from ESFs varied both among EOC positions and
between civilian and military. An attempt to gather more inputs from EOC positions would
result in more data that could be more accurate in its depiction of the network.
Finally, caution needs to be taken when mixing network level and node level analysis. In
this case the results are viable since the networks are comprised of the same nodes. Again this is
based on the assumption that EOCs will adhere to the guidance of the NRF. If an EOC is simply
imposing their own structure and policy on the labels and nomenclature provided by the NRF
then further clarification and analysis is necessary to mix the methods.
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V. Conclusion

The goal of this thesis was to compare military and civilian EOCs at both the individual
level and at the network level. Based on these differences it was hoped that strategies could be
developed to improve the interoperability between the EOCs. A goal of the NRF is to create
interoperability by defining a common organizational template so that differences between EOCs
might be minimized. The analysis found several similarities and differences. It is unclear
whether these differences are a result of differing procedures and policies which could strain the
military/civilian relationship or if they are the result of unclear definitions for the duties of ESFs
and structure of the EOC. It is apparent that the SNA method can be used to gain a unique
insight into how the EOC operates during different situations and in different environments, such
as military versus civilian, and varying levels of experience or training events throughout the
United States.
The analysis showed that there are few, if any, common key players between networks.
If it is assumed that ESFs or nodes perform similar functions in both networks, which could be
inferred from the NRF, it is possible to conclude that if given a common crisis event each
network would respond differently. This could cause confusion in a joint response. This is not
to say that one network must change how they do business. It is possible, especially at a low
level such as county to county or city to city, that joint training events can either draw both
EOCs to a common process or at least develop an understanding of each other’s operations in
order to reduce confusion. The drawback to this philosophy is obvious in a catastrophic event.
In this event, resources from outside the local area will be called in for assistance and they will
not have had the opportunity to share processes or training. This is why a common and accepted
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framework for operations is important. It needs to drive common definitions and goals while
allowing organizations to capitalize on their own strengths and abilities.
The analysis also showed that there is a mix of similarities and differences between
network level metrics. Again these similarities and differences should not be characterized as
solely positive or negative. They could represent extenuating circumstances that must be
controlled. They do highlight possible cultural differences within an organization, manifested as
the presence of structural holes in the military networks due to a strong reliance in a hierarchical
structure. The broker present in these structural holes could perform a beneficial role in the
network by sharing information. They could also act as micromanagers and slow the network
down to point where it becomes inoperable.
While these results might not solely define the level of interoperability between EOCs
they do provide insight to factors that can affect EOC interoperability. Interoperability in
today’s interconnected, global environment, is difficult to define. It doesn’t necessarily mean we
do everything exactly the same but at some level it should mean that we understand how our
partners are performing their operations. The results shown here provide an invaluable look into
the inner workings of the new EOC structure. Further work in this area is sure to provide more
insights that improve our ability to respond to crisis events and our command and control
functions.

Future Research
With the current data set in this study there are several SNA metrics which could be
applied. It would be interesting to see what kind of cliques or clusters are present in the
networks. It is possible that the four main components of the ICS are present in the EOC. If so,
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organizing the EOC around that clique could improve performance. Some of these groupings
can be seen when you take a more in-depth look at the in-closeness measure of the task
networks. Additionally, groupings of ESF positions by in-closeness score can be seen and could
be the result of strong working relationships. A further exploration of these groupings could
show more similarities or differences between the military and civilian EOCs. Additionally, a
comparison of job performance evaluations to SNA metrics in the specific EOCs could result in
a new evaluation tool. Instead of depending on past literature to provide the strong correlation
between SNA metrics and performance an ongoing study at several EOCs could relate SNA
metrics with specific performance appraisals based on exercise critiques and individual
performance reviews. If a correlation is found the SNA metrics could be used to provide a more
objective and quantifiable evaluation of EOCs in order to better disperse funds for improvements
or as a rating system during Inspector General visits.
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Appendix A: Survey

Joseph Legradi Survey Purpose

Survey Control Number: SCN 09-002
Privacy Notice
The following information is provided as required by the Privacy Act of 1974:
Purpose: Since September 11th 2001 the Department Of Homeland Security has directed, through the publication of HSPD-5, that all federal, state and local
EM agencies adopt the National Response Framework and the National Incident Management System as a way to improve interoperability; thus the new AF
Incident Management System (AFIMS).
This survey will focus on how an AF Emergency Operation Center (EOC) compares to a civilian EOC in the form of organization structure and information
management. The results from this data can be reciprocated to civilian EOCs working with local AF bases. Please answer all questions based on the current
EOC (NIMS/NRF/AFIMS) concept and not previous systems (ie Survival Recovery Center).
Participation: Welcome to this survey sponsored by Air Staff A7CX. Your participation is greatly appreciated and will help the US Air Force (AF)
determine how well it is doing to increase interoperability between our Emergency Management (EM) and that of our civilian counterparts. This survey
should not take more than 15 minutes of your time.
Confidentiality: We ask for some demographic information in order to interpret results more accurately. ALL ANSWERS ARE ANONYMOUS. No one
other than the research team will see your completed questionnaire. Findings will be reported at the group level only.

Instructions
Base your answers on your own thoughts & experiences
Please make your answers clear and concise when asked to answer in a response or when providing comments
Be sure to select the correct option button when asked

Contact information:
If you have any questions or comments about the survey, contact Maj Joe Legradi or LtC David Smith at the number, fax, mailing address, or e-mail
address listed below.
AFIT/ENV BLDG 640 / Room 104A
2950 Hobson Way
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-7765
Email: joseph.legradi@afit.edu
Advisor: david.smith@afit.edu
Phone: DSN 785-3636x7395, commercial (937) 255-3636x7395
Fax: DSN 986-4699; commercial (937) 656-4699

Start Survey

NOTICE & CONSENT BANNER:
Use of this DoD computer system, authorized or unauthorized, constitutes consent to monitoring of this system. Unauthorized use may subject you to criminal
prosecution. Evidence of unauthorized use collected during monitoring may be used for administrative, criminal, or other adverse action. Use of this system
constitutes consent to monitoring for these purposes.

http://is-afit-40:1999/Surveys/jlegradiSurvey/[3/9/2009 11:02:21 AM]

Joseph Legradi Survey Page 1

Section I: Background Information
1

Select the Emergency Support Function (ESF) or EOC position that you are most often assigned to as your “Primary Position” and select
any other Emergency Support Function (ESF) or EOC position for which you also have responsibility as your “Alternate Position”?
For each question click on the Tooltip Tables link for definitions and explanations of each function or information tool.
ESF

Primary Position

Alternate Position

ESF #1: Transportation (LRS)

✔

ESF #2: Communications (CS)

✔

ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering (CES)

✔

ESF #4: Firefighting (Fire Emergency Services)

✔

ESF #5: Emergency Management (CE Emergency Management)

✔

ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services (SVS)

✔

ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support (LRS)

✔

ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services (MDG)

✔

ESF #9: Search and Rescue (CES)

✔

ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response (CES)

✔

ESF #11: Agriculture and Natural Resources (MDG)

✔

ESF #12: Energy (CES)

✔

ESF #13: Public Safety and Security (SFS)

✔

ESF #14: Long-Term Community Recovery (CES)

✔

ESF #15: External Affairs (PA)

✔

EOC Manager

✔

EOC Director

✔

Continue

http://is-afit-40:1999/Surveys/jlegradiSurvey/default.cfm?StepNum=2[3/9/2009 11:02:40 AM]

Joseph Legradi Survey page 2

Section I: Background Information (continued)

2

How many times have you been involved with the EOC or some other emergency management function during a crisis event, both real world
and training, in the past 4 years?

3

To what base/location are you assigned?

4

Approximately how long have you been involved with Emergency Management functions throughout your entire career? (Mon 1-12/Yr 020+)
Months

Years

Next Section

http://is-afit-40:1999/Surveys/jlegradiSurvey/default.cfm?StepNum=3[3/9/2009 11:02:55 AM]

Joseph Legradi Survey page 3

Instructions for Section II: Crisis Event
Please answer the following questions based on the below scenario as it would pertain to your location. Also, please answer the questions based on a
combination of past experiences, training, and pertinent checklists/AFIs. For each question click on the "Tooltip Table" link for definitions and
explanations of each function or information tool. The scenario information is intentionally general in nature to allow each ESF to respond based on
their realm of expertise.

Scenario:
A CBRNE event has occurred directly outside of the local military installation and within the area of responsibility for the local civilian responders.
Civilian emergency response assets respond and the base has been requested and approved to lend whatever support is necessary. Information is
sparse but assume any or multiple CBRNE events have occurred and there might be recurring attacks. There is severe damage to local
infrastructure and a mass casualty situation. Assume the Red Cross and other applicable non-government organizations will be responding and that
the response process will last for several days.
The EOC is formed and progressed through the stages of the crisis event. Information was slow to come in. Initially there are no reports of cordons,
casualties or extent of damage. The beginning of the incident lacked information and details.
As the event progressed first responders arrived on scene and performed their missions. Follow on Emergency Response forces and Reserve forces
were called in to quantify and qualify the incident. Cordons were secured and evacuations were completed. Casualties were processed and
transported from the scene.
All major life, property, and environmental saving efforts were mostly completed and the situation is approaching a stable, steady state of
operations. There is still heavy damage and contamination that needs to be dealt with and some search and recovery operations are still ongoing.

Continue
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Joseph Legradi Survey Page 4

Section II: Crisis Event
5

On the following scale please select the frequency you would need to communicate with each ESF or function listed below during the crisis
event, in order to exchange information, documents, schedules, and other resources to get your job done? "(For this question, use your ESF
or organizational block to report communications internal to your unit. For example I am in ESF 3, and for the ESF 3 block below I will report
how often I communicate with my own unit.)
For each question click on the Tooltip Tables link for definitions and explanations of each function or information tool.
Scroll mouse over each row to see tooltips

Never

Very Rarely

Rarely

ESF #1: Transportation (LRS)
ESF #2: Communications (CS)
ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering (CES)
ESF #4: Firefighting (Fire Emergency Services)
ESF #5: Emergency Management (CE
Emergency Management)
ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance,
Housing, and Human Services (SVS)
ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource
Support (LRS)
ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
(MDG)
ESF #9: Search and Rescue (CES)
ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
(CES)
ESF #11: Agriculture and Natural Resources
(MDG)
ESF #12: Energy (CES)
ESF #13: Public Safety and Security (SFS)
ESF #14: Long-Term Community Recovery
(CES)
ESF #15: External Affairs (PA)
EOC Manager
EOC Director
Other
If "Other", please explain

Continue
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Occasionally

Frequently

Very
Frequently

Joseph Legradi Survey Page 5

Section II: Crisis Event (continued)
6

On the following scale please select the frequency you would need to communicate with each ESF or function listed below during the crisis
event, in order to seek inputs, advice, and opinions before making a key decision?"(For this question, use your ESF or organizational block to
report communications internal to your unit. For example I am in ESF 3, and for the ESF 3 block below I will report how often I communicate
with my own unit.)
For each question click on the Tooltip Tables link for definitions and explanations of each function or information tool.
Scroll mouse over each row to see tooltips

Never

Very Rarely

Rarely

ESF #1: Transportation (LRS)
ESF #2: Communications (CS)
ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering (CES)
ESF #4: Firefighting (Fire Emergency Services)
ESF #5: Emergency Management (CE
Emergency Management)
ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance,
Housing, and Human Services (SVS)
ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource
Support (LRS)
ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
(MDG)
ESF #9: Search and Rescue (CES)
ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
(CES)
ESF #11: Agriculture and Natural Resources
(MDG)
ESF #12: Energy (CES)
ESF #13: Public Safety and Security (SFS)
ESF #14: Long-Term Community Recovery
(CES)
ESF #15: External Affairs (PA)
EOC Manager
EOC Director
Other
If Other, please explain

Continue
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Section II: Crisis Event (continued)
7

On the following scale please select the frequency you would need to use the information tools below, to exchange information, documents,
schedules, and other resources to get your job done during the crisis event?
For each question click on the Tooltip Tables link for definitions and explanations of each function or information tool.
Never

Very Rarely

Rarely

Online Chat
"Digital Dashboard"
Mission status reporting
Damage Assessment
Radio
Net Based checklist management
Net Based Regulations, AFIs, Policy, Guidance,
Forms, ERG, NIMS forms/protocols
Net Based Mapping tool (including cordons,
icons, plume models, alerts and other event
plotting)
Dry Erase Status Boards
Net Based Event Log
Net Based Current and Forecasted Weather
Conditions
Net Based Personnel Accounting (including DIM
counts)
Personnel Accounting on Paper (including DIM
counts)
Face to Face Communication
Cell phone Voice
Cell phone text message
Cell phone Instant Talk
Other 1
If "Other 1", please explain
Other 2
If "Other 2", please explain
Other 3

http://is-afit-40:1999/Surveys/jlegradiSurvey/Default.cfm?StepNum=7[3/9/2009 11:04:30 AM]
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If "Other 3", please explain

Next Section
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Appendix B: Closeness Centrality

Node

Military Task
In
Node Out
1 19.75
1
44.44
2 19.51
2
53.33
3 18.60
3
76.19
4 19.51
4 100.00
5 19.75
5
69.57
6 19.05
6
80.00
7 19.75
7
76.19
8 19.51
8
94.12
9 23.53
9
10 19.28
10
76.19
11 21.92
11
12 20.78
12
13 19.28
13
80.00
14 22.86
14
15 18.18
15
88.89
16 19.51
16 100.00
17 19.51
17
88.89

Sum
Average
STD
Mean + 1STD

Node
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Civilian Task
In
Node
19.75
1
19.75
2
24.24
3
23.88
4
19.51
5
19.51
6
19.28
7
19.75
8
22.54
9
19.05
10
18.82
11
21.92
12
19.51
13
19.28
14
19.28
15
19.75
16
19.75
17

Out
76.19
100.00

100.00
72.73
84.21
88.89
72.73
50.00
100.00
88.89
69.57
100.00
84.21

340.29
20.02
1.45

1027.81
79.06
16.52

345.58
20.33
1.70

1087.41
83.65
15.14

21.46

95.58

22.03

98.78

74

Node

Military Decision
In
Node Out
1 18.39
1
51.61
2 17.78
2
51.61
3 18.39
3
76.19
4 19.05
4
61.54
5 19.51
5
69.57
6 18.60
6
66.67
7 17.78
7 100.00
8 19.28
8
80.00
9 22.86
9
10 18.39
10
72.73
11 22.22
11
12 21.33
12
13 19.05
13
45.71
14 22.22
14
15 18.39
15
59.26
16 19.28
16 100.00
17 19.75
17
80.00

Sum
Average
STD
Mean + 1STD

Node
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Civilian Decision
In
Node Out
18.60
1
69.57
18.82
2
84.21
23.19
3
22.86
4
19.51
5 100.00
19.28
6
66.67
18.60
7
80.00
19.51
8
61.54
22.86
9
18.60
10
61.54
18.60
11
39.02
21.62
12
19.05
13 100.00
19.28
14
76.19
18.60
15
72.73
19.75
16 100.00
19.28
17
88.89

332.27
19.55
1.61

914.89
70.38
17.10

338.03
19.88
1.64

1000.35
76.95
18.01

21.16

87.47

21.52

94.96
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Appendix C: Flow Betweenness Centrality
Military Task
Node nFB
9 0.00
11 0.00
12 0.00
14 0.00
1 0.36
6 1.25
5 1.64
15 2.08
13 2.24
10 2.71
3 5.57
17 5.58
8 5.89
16 7.36
4 20.77
7 33.97
2 36.91

Civilian Task
Node nFB
9 0.00
12 0.00
3 0.00
4 0.00
15 3.47
10 4.98
11 5.48
7 5.51
1 6.00
14 6.26
17 6.47
6 6.53
5 6.99
13 7.51
16 8.46
2 8.57
8 9.44

Mean
7.43 Mean
STD
11.33 STD
Mean + 118.76

5.04
3.11
8.15

NCI

4.68

31.32

Military Decision
Node
nFB
9 0.00
11 0.00
12 0.00
14 0.00
2 0.22
4 1.49
15 2.12
13 2.34
10 2.54
8 4.02
5 4.71
6 6.91
1 7.26
16 11.69
17 13.06
3 14.76
7 20.73
Mean
STD

5.40
6.02
11.42
16.28
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Civilian Decision
Node
nFB
9 0.00
12 0.00
3 0.00
4 0.00
11 0.29
1 3.67
15 4.24
7 4.86
6 5.83
14 5.85
2 7.51
10 7.54
13 7.84
17 8.20
8 10.52
16 10.95
5 15.55
Mean
STD

5.46
4.41
9.87
10.72

Appendix D: Comparison of SNA Measures
Military Task
Node
In

Civilian Task
Node
In

Centrality 11 (Ag&Nat) 21.92 9 (SAR) 22.54
(Key Players) 14 (LT Rec) 22.86 4 (Fire) 23.88
9 (SAR)
23.53
3 (PW)
24.24
Breakpoint
21.46
22.03
Network
Closeness
index (NCI)
2.54
2.74
Military Decision Civilian Decision
Node
In
Node
In
12 (Energy) 21.33 12 (Energy) 21.62
Centrality 11 (Ag&Nat) 22.22 4 (Fire) 22.86
(Key Players) 14 (LT Rec) 22.22 9 (SAR) 22.86
9 (SAR)
22.86
3 (PW)
23.19
Breakpoint
21.16
21.52
Network
Closeness
index (NCI)
2.46
2.42
Military Task
Civilian Task
Node
nFBC
Node
nFBC
Flow
4 (Fire)
20.77
Betweenness
7 (Log)
33.97
Centrality
8 (PH)
9.44
(Key Players) 2 (Comm) 36.91
Breakpoint
18.76
8.15
NFBI
31.32
4.68
Density
Density
0.53
0.59
# of Ties
# of Ties
Density
145
160
total ties possible total ties possible
271.99
272.02

77

Military Task
Node
Out

Civilian Task
Node
Out
2 (Comm) 100.00
5 (EM) 100.00
4 (Fire) 100.00 13 (SFS) 100.00
16 (Mgr) 100.00 16 (Mgr) 100.00
95.58
98.78

2.72
2.13
Military Decision Civilian Decision
Node
Out
Node
Out

7 (Log) 100.00
16 (Mgr) 100.00
87.47

5 (EM) 100.00
13 (SFS) 100.00
16 (Mgr) 100.00
94.96

3.85
3.00
Military Decision Civilian Decision
Node
nFBC
Node
nFBC
16 (Mgr) 11.69
17 (Dir) 13.06
8 (PH)
10.52
3 (PW)
14.76 16 (Mgr) 10.95
7 (Log)
20.73
5 (EM)
15.55
11.42
9.87
16.28
10.72
Density
Density
0.40
0.51
# of Ties
# of Ties
109
138
total ties
total ties
272.02
271.97
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